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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 15/05/2006 Accident number: 225 
Accident time: 12:45 Accident Date: 03/09/1997 
Where it occurred: Cajnice, Nr Gorazde, 
RS 
Country: Bosnia Herzegovina 
Primary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Inadequate equipment 
(?) 
Class: Tripwire accident Date of main report: 10/09/1997 
ID original source: DB/RK Name of source: BiH MAC 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: PROM-1 AP Bfrag Ground condition: bushes/scrub 
route (verge) 
trees 
Date record created: 17/02/2004 Date  last modified: 17/02/2004 
No of victims: 2 No of documents: 2 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: GR: CP 409294 Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: GORAZDE Map series: DMA 5B 
Map edition:  Map sheet: 2882 2 
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate equipment (?) 
inappropriate vegetation cutting tool (?) 
partner's failure to "control" (?) 
safety distances ignored (?) 
vegetation clearance problem (?) 
inadequate training (?) 
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Accident report 
The demining group involved in the accident deploys two-man teams using a one-man drill, 
in which one deminer clears undergrowth, uses the detector and excavates finds while the 
other "controls" him. 
An accident report was prepared for the UN MAC by internal staff. That report was made 
available and the following summarises its content. The original report is available under 
Related papers at the “Other documents” tab. 
The accident occurred in an area described as a wooded embankment at the side of a road. 
"Bushes and foliage on the ground" were described as "fairly dense". [Photographs of the 
site showed that the undergrowth was green with new growth but not dense. The site was 
under the canopy of trees and the leaf litter and individual stems could be seen clearly to a 
depth in the undergrowth not less that 30cm.] The ground sloped steeply upward to a track 
three metres to the left of the accident site but two metres above it. The demining group 
were clearing a safe lane through the area, with spurs off it to allow later dog access. 
The site had a permanently stationed independent QA monitor at all times. 
The two man team involved in the accident had only been under that Team Leader for one 
day, having been moved from another site.  
At 09:40 the two victims found and disarmed a PROM-1 in their lane. The Team Leader 
corrected them because he should have been informed and decided what action was to be 
taken with the mine.  
At 12:40 the two victims were at an appropriate place to site a spur, so the Team Leader 
instructed them to start a lane off to the left. The deminers changed roles, exchanging 
leggings and marking tape when they did so [only one set of leggings was issued per pair of 
deminers]. As Victim No.2 was withdrawing his partner asked him to pass the machete. He 
returned and did so, then walked away again. He was about five metres away when the mine 
detonated.  
Victim No.2 was found cradling Victim No.1 by the Team Leader and others who helped him 
to a safe area and medical support. Victim No.2 left for Cajnice hospital within five minutes of 
the accident. He had a cut on the right of his jaw and two wounds in his right leg. Victim No.1 
was pronounced dead by the medic. He had wounds on both sides of his chest, the left side 
of his neck and his right leg. His body was moved to the hospital about 2.5 hours later after 
all clearance drills in his vicinity had been completed. He had not been wearing the collar of 
his protective suit at the time. Victim No.2 was moved to Socolac hospital at 19:00 "for 
observation". 
The demining group manager said that "the undergrowth was not very thick and therefore 
tripwire feeler drills were deemed unnecessary in the area as visual detection forward of the 
deminer was quite possible". He also mentioned that grapples used to pull tripwires were not 
approved by the demining company.  
At the scene of the accident the investigators noted a machete, a prodder, a bayonet and a 
mine detector. They saw no sign of a tripwire feeler or shears. 
The investigators found that the groin protector on Victim No.1's protective suit had been 
"perforated in two places" and had no "neck protector attached". They found no fragment 
marks on his visor. [They do not mention damage to the armour in the chest area where 
there were severe penetrating injuries so it is assumed that the equipment was damaged.] 
The investigators identified the mine from shrapnel found at the site. [They do not appear to 
have looked for the base plate.] 
  
Conclusion 
The investigators found that the team were not equipped with appropriate tools, the victims 
were not keeping the required safety distance and that the two victims appeared to be either 
undisciplined or unfamiliar with proper drills. 
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Recommendations 
The investigators recommended that a helmet and visor should be worn in fragmentation 
mine areas and that "if so equipped, the collar should be worn with the flak jacket". [This is 
presumably because the helmet visor is shorter than a full-face visor on a head-frame.] 
Also that teams should be equipped with a "tripwire feeler, metal detector and prodder". 
They added that "only horizontal cutting tools" should be allowed, saying that "no vertical 
cutting tools or striking tools should be allowed in the clearance lane". The changeover of 
deminers in a team should be done as a "drill" with work not starting until the retiring deminer 
is at a safe distance. New Team members should be well briefed and should, when 
necessary, be placed with existing team members so that they know how the team operates. 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 290 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: DECEASED 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: not recorded 
Protection issued: Frag jacket 
Long visor 
Trousers/leggings 
Protection used: Frag jacket, Long 
visor, Leggings 
 
Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES 
severe Abdomen 
severe Chest 
severe Genitals 
FATAL 
COMMENT 
See medical report. 
 
Medical report 
A brief field medic's report described Victim No.1's injuries as "hard injury of artery and 
genitals…I tried to put drip but it did not work out because the veins failed".  
Another deminer arrived before the medic. He stated that Victim No.1 “was bleeding in the 
genital area and top part of his chest. I cut off the jacket and shirt to find more holes 
bleeding. I applied my bomb-bandage to one of the bleeding holes I then started to apply 
CPR only to see when I done my first heart massage blood coming out several holes. I then 
stopped CPR." 
A statement from a demining group manager who visited the site on the day listed the 
victim's injuries as: “perforated corratol artery, perforated femoral artery, large right chest 
wound, small left chest wound, wounds to genital area. Dead 3-5 minutes after arrival of 
medic.” 
The statement reported that "the full blast was absorbed by [Victim No.1] in the genitals". 
Apparently Victim No.1 said, "I'm dead" and lost consciousness. 
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 Victim Report 
Victim number: 291 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: not recorded 
Protection issued: Frag jacket 
Long visor 
Protection used: not recorded 
 
Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES 
severe Face 
severe Leg 
COMMENT 
See medical report. 
 
Medical report 
A statement from a demining group manager who visited the site on the day listed Victim 
No.2's injuries as: "shrapnel wound to right leg above and below the knee. One piece 
shrapnel to right side of jaw. Jaw believed to be fractured".  
 
Analysis 
This accident is classed as a "Management/control inadequacy" because the victim was not 
provided with a suitable tool to cut the undergrowth cautiously. The secondary cause is listed 
as “Inadequate equipment” because a machete is the wrong tool to use in an area where 
trip-wires are suspected.  
The field management were applying the SOPs as correctly as they could, but they were not 
provided with adequate tools. It is possible that, given the tools available, the victim was 
working as properly as possible - apart from not waiting for his partner to withdraw.   
The investigators recommend the use of a helmet and visor. The victim was not wearing a 
helmet, but was wearing a visor. The accident did not involve head injuries and the only 
recorded head injuries in that country at the time had occurred to deminers wearing helmets 
that failed. The potential fragment speed from the PROM-1 is far higher than the protection 
offered by the helmets used. The helmet is disliked by the deminers for reasons of comfort. It 
gives differential protection (with the visor providing half the fragment protection of the 
helmet). It is peculiar to insist that the top of the head should have more protection than the 
forehead.  
 
Related papers 
The file included statements from those who attended the victim and the Team Leader, a 
detailed map, a crude sketch map, photographs of the accident site and another mine, and 
poorly detailed photographs of the victim's armour which appeared to have separated front to 
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back into the separate panels it was made up of [possibly explaining how the chest injuries 
occurred without damaging the armour enough for the investigators to notice].  
 
Original BoI report 
The following is the original BoI report, edited for anonymity. 
REPORT ON MINE ACCIDENT AT CP 409294 IN CAJNICE 
Supporting Documentation 
 A: [Demining group] mine incident report. 
 B: Statement of [name excised] (Operations Manager for [Demining group]). 
 C: Statement of [name excised] (Team Leader). 
 D: Statement of [name excised]  (Medic). 
 E: Statement by [name excised] (Interpreter). 
 F: Statement by [name excised] (Gurkha deminer). 
 G: Statement by [name excised] (Dog Handler). 
 H: Map series DMA 5B GORAZDE map sheet 2882-2. 
 I:  Photos of site 
 J:  Site sketch 
  
INTRODUCTION 
1. A mine accident occurred 03 September 1997 at 12h45. The accident resulted in one 
fatality. A second deminer sustained minor injuries. 
2. On the same day a board of inquiry was appointed with [name excised] and Captain 
[name excised] representing the UNMAC. 
 The accident was reported to the local authorities and they are also conducting an 
investigation. 
PROCESS OF THE INVESTIGATION  
3. The board of investigation: 
a. [Name excised], Operations Officer, UN MAC HQ Sarajevo. 
b. Capt. [name excised], Contracts Officer, UN MAC HQ Sarajevo. 
4. The investigation board arrived at the [Demining group] facility at Luke at approximately 
10h45 04 September 1997. Persons who had been present on the demining site at the 
time of the accident were made available for interview at this time. [Victim no.2], the 
deminer who was injured in the accident was interviewed in hospital later. 
5. The board collected prepared written statements and conducted separate interviews with 
several of the individuals who had been involved in the accident. A model of the accident 
site was used to aid the interviews. 
6. Following the interviews, the board visited the local hospital to view the body of the 
deceased, [Victim No.1], to note the extent and details of his injuries. 
7. The board visited the site of the accident and was given a detailed briefing by the team 
Leader, [name excised]. Photographs of the task site and the scene of the accident were 
taken. The board concluded this preliminary investigation at approximately 15h00. 
8. [Name excised] and Capt. [name excised] interviewed the injured deminer, [Victim no.2] 
09 September 1997 at the military hospital at Sokolac. 
SITE 
9. The accident occurred at Grid Reference CP 409294, in the Cajnice municipality in 
Republika Srpska. The site is approximately nine kilometres south east of Gorazde. The 
area is a former confrontation line. The task site is on a wooded embankment along the 
side of a road. Refer to attachments H and I. 
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10. UN MAC does not hold minefield records for this site. Local intelligence gave most of the 
mine indications during survey of this area and when work began PROM Anti Personnel 
mines were discovered. 
11. The location where the accident occurred is approximately 120 metres west of the task 
site Control Point. A safe lane was being established parallel with the main roadway. At 
the point where the accident occurred, the safe lane was following a narrow track. A 
discernible pathway was about three metres to the left of the safe lane and about two 
metres higher than the safe lane at the point of the accident. Bushes and foliage on the 
ground are fairly dense and this makes the task of looking for mines difficult. 
12. Despite the difficulty of demining operations in this area, the layout of the site  was good, 
marking was clear and the site was well maintained.    
GEOGRAPHY 
13. The area is mountainous. The task site is on the West side of the Janjina brook valley. 
Toward the brook is meadow with trees and scrub. To the west of the valley is a steep 
wooded hillside, along which winds the main roadway between Cajnice and Gorazde. The 
hillside is wooded with trees and bushes. The slope is very steep and varies between 
open and thickly bushed area. This area is difficult for demining operations. 
TASKING 
14. The Republika Srpska PIU, on a project funded by the World Bank, contracts [Demining 
group] for demining operations in this area. The objective of this task was to clear a track 
that leads through the forest. The conduct of the task was to establish a safe lane, and at 
regular intervals, establish lanes to the left, up the embankment, to allow access for 
further survey by dog teams.  
SUPERVISION  
15. The Team Leader, [name excised] was supervising the team at the time of the accident. 
The PIU monitor was also on the site at the time of the accident. 
16. The two-man team involved in this accident had been working as part of [name excised]’s 
team for one day only. They had been drafted in from another [Demining group] team. 
COMMUNICATIONS 
17. The [Demining group] team had radio communication from the site to the [Demining 
group] regional office in Luke and [Demining group] head office in Brus. These 
communications were used to inform the office in Brus of the accident. 
MEDICAL 
18. The Team’s medical officer, Ms [name excised] was approximately 120 metres from the 
accident and administered first aid immediately after the explosion. 
THE MINE 
19. The mine in this accident was a PROM-1PK. Identification was determined after 
excavation of the crater. The mine is a variant of PROM 1 with the following 
characteristics. 
a. Weight:                  3kg 
b. Type:                     Bounding Fragmentation 
c. Explosive:             421g TNT/TETRYL 
d. Bounding  height: 70cm 
e. Fuse:                     Tripwire and Pressure 
f. Killing Radius:     40m  
g. Bounding charge: 3g Black Powder 
KIT AND EQUIPMENT 
20. During the interview in hospital, [Victim No.2] stated that each member of the team was 
wearing protective clothing. The deminers were wearing protective visors but not helmets. 
During the changeover drill between the two deminers just prior to the accident, the team 
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had exchanged leg protection. At the time of detonation (the deceased) was wearing the 
leg protectors. 
21. On examination of the protective suit of the deceased, it was noted that the groin 
protector was perforated in two places and there was no neck protector attached. There 
were no shrapnel markings on the visor. 
22. A machete, a prodder, a bayonet and a mine detector were observed by the investigation 
board at the accident site. No tripwire feeler or shears were used by the demining team 
immediately prior to or at the time of the accident. 
23. Medical equipment and an ambulance were available on the site at the time of the 
accident. 
ACCOUNT OF ACCIDENT  
24. This account is assembled from statements and interviews taken from witnesses. 
On 03 September 1997 at approximately 09h40, a two-man demining team, consisting of 
[Victim no.1] and [Victim no.2] were working in a clearance lane when they discovered and 
disarmed a PROM 1PK Anti Personnel mine. This was not reported to the team leader until 
afterwards. The team leader, [name excised], states that when he learned of this, he was 
concerned and had corrected the men and advised them of proper procedures; that the team 
leader had to be notified on discovery of a mine as he was the only one who could direct 
action to be taken. The team leader had warned all members on the site be vigilant and to be 
especially aware of PROM type mines in the area. 
25. At approximately 12h40, the same two-man team was working at the end of the safe lane. 
The Team Leader decided that this was an appropriate place to establish a clearance 
lane up the bank to their left side. The Team Leader met with the team at the end of the 
safe lane and discussed the approach and exact location of the new lane. The new lane 
would be up a steep bank, crossing a small pathway about three metres from the safe 
lane. The new lane would take them past a small, dense bush. The team leader states 
that he told the deminers to be careful when working in the area of this bush.  
26. After the Team Leader had moved away the demining team carried out a changeover drill 
prior to starting the new clearance lane. [Victim no.1] (deceased) was now in the number 
one position and [Victim no.2] moved to the number two position. [Victim no.2] passed 
lane marking material and leg protection on to [Victim no.1].  
27. As [Victim no.2] was moving away from the uncleared area [Victim no.1] asked him for 
the machete. [Victim no.2] returned and gave [Victim no.1] the machete. After handing 
over the machete [Victim no.2] turned to move away again. [Victim no.2] was 
approximately five metres away from [Victim no.1] when the explosion occurred. 
28. The team leader was about 30 metres away at this time and rushed to the site where he 
found [Victim no.2] crouched on the ground, cradling [Victim no.1]. The dog handler, 
[name excised], arrived to give assistance and the Team Leader went to assist the medic 
to the scene. The Team Leader then went to the Control Point to coordinate CASEVAC. 
29.  The injured [Victim no.2] was assisted from the scene and evacuated to Cajnice hospital. 
Approximately two-and-a-half hours later, the body of the deceased was moved to the 
hospital. 
30. [Name excised] sealed the site; all was left in place for the investigation team. 
INJURIES 
31. The deceased was ascertained to be dead by the medic on site after checking for a 
pulse, breathing and listening for a heart beat. From the viewing of the body, it was noted 
that the deceased had a wound in the left and right hand side of the chest, the left side of 
the neck, and the right leg. 
32. The injured person had a cut to his jaw on the right side and two wounds in the right leg. 
CONCLUSIONS 
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33. The team was working in a minefield known to contain bounding fragmentation mines 
(PROM). This information was known from local intelligence and the fact that at least two 
PROM had already been found. Photographs of these mines are in the photo file 
attached.  
34. According to shrapnel found on the accident site, the detonated mine was a PROM 
bounding fragmentation mine. 
35. It is probable that [Victim no.1] was using the machete at the time of the accident. The 
mine may have been activated by the deminer taking hold of the vegetation to cut it or by 
a striking action of the machete. 
36. The deceased was wearing his issued fragmentation jacket at the time of the accident. 
This type of fragmentation jacket is normally issued with a removable collar, which is 
designed to protect the wearer’s neck. [Victim no.1] was not wearing this removable 
collar; therefore his jacket was incomplete. Shrapnel perforated the protective suit in at 
least two places. 
37. The injured team member was not outside the required safety distance from the working 
deminer. 
38. The team was not using a tripwire feeler. They were relying on visual inspection and mine 
detector to find trip wires prior to advancing or clearing brush. A machete was being used 
to cut brush. 
39. Incorrect changeover drills were being used when number one started to work before the 
number two was out of the danger area. 
40. The two-man team involved in this accident had recently been moved to the group and 
had worked under the supervision of [name excised] for one day only. The disarming of 
the PROM earlier in the day without following proper procedures and the improper 
procedures noted above indicates that this two-man team were either undisciplined or 
unfamiliar with proper drills. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
41. When working in areas where there are fragmentation mines, it is recommended that a 
helmet with visor be worn. If so equipped, the collar should be worn with the flak jacket.  
42. Demining teams should be equipped with the correct tools to carry out demining tasks. 
This should include tripwire feeler, metal detector, and prodder. 
43.  Only horizontal cutting tools should be used to clear undergrowth or foliage. No vertical 
cutting tools or striking tools should be allowed into clearance lanes. 
44. Team Leaders are responsible for ensuring that teams are properly equipped for the task. 
45. The changeover procedure between deminer number one and deminer number two 
should be carried out as a drill. Number one should brief number two on exactly what he 
has done and to which point the working lane has been cleared. Deminer number two is 
to be outside the danger area before deminer number one commences work in the 
clearance lane. 
46. When a new clearance lane is started, the Team Leader should fully brief the two-man 
demining team to ensure that they know precisely what is expected of them. 
47. New members to a team should be briefed by the Team Leader about procedures and 
safety issues with particular attention to detail. The team leader must not assume that 
new members to a team will work in the same way as existing team members. If 
necessary, new members should work with other members of the team until they are 
familiar with and follow all standard procedures. 
Signed: UNMAC, UNMAC Contracts Officer 
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